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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
U t a h Code of

Crimi

'. Prccedu

"A peace officer n tay stop ar iy persoi i ii I
a public place when he has a reasonable
suspicioi i to believe that he has cominitted
or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and
may denial id his name, address and an
e x p I a n a t i o ii o f 1 i i s a c t i on s . "
T h e C o n s 1 1 1 u t ion o f U t ah , A r t i c 1 e 1, § 1 4 :
'The :"i:::n e. '.:. p : o p i to b e s e c u r e in
t h e i r p e r s o n s , h o u s e s , p a p e r s 'iiid e f f e c t s
aga iust unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause suppcrt.ee by
cat:: or affirmation, particularly describing
^arched and the person or
:he u 1 FiCC to be
:hinc to be seized."
I,!1 i< ;

d n * e n t 1: ( ) 111 e C o i i s t :i t I :i t :i o i :s o f 11 i e II i i :il t e d

States:
"The right of the people + r be secure ':.
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable 'v-uso supported by
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oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized,"
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 29, 1985, the defendants were charged with
possession of controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to
distribute for value.
On June 5, 1985, the defendants appeared with counsel for
arraignment in the District Court and filed a motion to suppress
evidence.
In a pre-trial hearing in the District Court on July 10,
1985, the court granted defendant's motion to suppress all
evidence surrounding the discovery of marijuana in the defendant
Carpena's vehicle.

This ruling was based on evidence of a

violation of defendant's constitutional rights by an illegal
seizure and subsequent search of the defendants and their
vehicle.

The charges against the defendants were subsequently

dismissed on the basis that the state had no further evidence to
support the charge.

The plaintiff is appealing the ruling of the

District Court on the suppression of this evidence.
STATEMENT OF TJIF FACTS
In November of 1985, Les Daroczi, attorney for the state
submitted an agreed statement as the record on appeal, pursuant
to Rule 11(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

This

statement was signed by attorneys for all parties involved and
was signed by the Honorable David E. Roth, District Court Judge,
who decided this case.
is as follows:

This agreed statement of record on appeal
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While patrolling around 3:00 a.m. in a neighborhood which
had a rash of recent burglaries, the police sergeant in charge of
the shift spotted defendant's vehicle proceeding at a slow pace.
The vehicle had an Arizona license.

Sgt. Malmborg followed said

vehicle for three blocks, then turned on his red lights.

No

criminal or traffic offense was observed up to this point, nor
had there been a report to the police of a vehicle burglary prior
to the stop.

The three occupants of said vehicle began moving

about and kept looking around, then slowly pulled into a driveway
of one of the occupant's residence.

This investigative stop led

to the discovery of a large quantity of marijuana

(approximately

30 pounds) in said vehicle.
The defendants, in a pretrial hearing, moved to suppress the
marijuana.

The court granted the motion, ruling there was no

reason to stop said vehicle.
In plaintiff's brief, there were references made which went
beyond the scope of the agreed statement of record on appeal.
Although there is no record submitted to the Supreme Court with
this evidence, these additional statements must be clarified.
After the two defendants and another individual who was in
the vehicle were stopped by the police in the driveway of this
other individual's residence, the police officer ordered the
individuals out of the car and the car was immediately searched.
During the course of this search, an unloaded pistol was
discovered under the driver's seat of the vehicle.

The officer

who found this pistol recognized that it was unloaded and the
fact that it was there was no violation of the law.

The officer
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then took the keys out of the ignition without permission and on
his way back to the trunk of the vehicle made a quick remark of
inquiry as to the ownership of the vehicle.

Without hesitation,

the officer commenced to open the trunkf at which point,
defendant Carpena stated, "I don't think I want you to do that."
The trunk was nevertheless opened and the marijuana was
discovered.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE SEARCH OF THE
DEFENDANTS CAR SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED SINCE
THE EVIDENCE WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF
THE DEFENDANTS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER
THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States guarantees that an individual will not be subjected to
unreasonable searches and seizures.

This guarantee extends net

only to the individual, but to his residence, his private effects
and his automobile.

The reasoning behind such a guarantee is

articulated by the Supreme Court in the case of Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S.I, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 LEd.2d 889 (1968), where the
court stated:
"It must be recognized that whenever a police
officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away he has 'seized1 that
person, and it is nothing less than sheer
torture of the English language to suggest
that a careful exploration of the outer
surfaces of a person's clothing all
over his or her body in an attempt to
find weapons is not a 'search1. Moreover,
it is simply fantastic to urge that such a
procedure performed in public by a policeman
while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps
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facing a wall with is hands raised, is a
'petty indignity'. It is a serious intrusion
upon the sanctity of the person, which may
inflict great indignity and arouse strong
resentment, and it is not to be taken
lightly."
Although the Supreme Court has somewhat expanded the
probably cause requirements for a seizure of an individual in
Terry v. Ohio, the Fourth Amendment still operates to restrict
the conduct of police officers to a very limited class of cases
in which the probable cause standard may be circumvented.
The court in Terry v. Ohio he]d that there must be a
"narrowly drawn authority" to permit searches of individuals
absent probable cause for arrest.

The court further held,

"In determining whether the officer acted
reasonably in such circumstances, due
weight must be given not to his inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch1, but to
the specific inferences which he is entitled
to draw from facts in light of his experience."
(Id at 27, emphasis added)
Numerous courts have applied this "reasonable suspicion"
test to various situations in a determination of whether or not
an individual's rights have been infringed upon.

The Supreme

Court in the case of Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 75 LEd.2d
229, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983) was presented with a situation where
two detectives detained and searched an individual at an airport
who fit a drug courier profile.

The facts revealed that a

nervous individual had purchased, with cash, a ticket under an
assumed name and was carryinq two heavy suitcases.

The detective

stopped and searched the individual and, with his consent,
searched his bags.

The Supreme Court affirmed a decision
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exciuding all evidence obtained by this tainted search.

In it's

decision, the Court held, "He (the defendant) may not be
detained, even momentarily, without reasonable, objective grounds
for doing so, and his refusal to listen or answer does not,
without more, furnish those grounds."

(Ijd at 498)

In the present case, Officer Malmborg's only grounds for
stopping defendants were, by his own testimony, because they were
driving slowly, it was late at night, there were three male
occupants and the license plates on the vehicles were from out of
state.
The state, in it's brief of appellant, improperly relied
upon the case of United States v. Sharp, 470 U.S.
LEd.2d 605, 106 S.Ct.

, 84

(1985) as dispositive of this issue

and therefore directly controlling the case at hand.

The U.S.

Supreme Court in Sharp summarily affirmed the lower court's
ruling on the initial stop and then spent the bulk of it's
decision deciding another issue concerning the permissable length
of post-stop detention.

(Icl at 613.)

The facts supporting the Supreme Court's affirmation of the
lower court's decision concerning the initial stop were a great
deal more substantial than those present in the case at hand.
addition to those cited in the appellant's brief, the Supreme
Court stated:
"Cook's (the officer) suspicions were
sufficiently aroused to follow the two
vehicles for approximately 20 miles as
they proceeded south into South Carolina.
He then decided to make an 'investigative
stop' and radioed the state highway
patrol for assistance. Officer Thrasher

In

-7-

driving a marked patrol car responded to
the call. Almost immediately after Thrasher
caught up with the procession, the Pontiac
and a pick-up turned off the highway and
onto a campground road. Cook and Thrasher
followed the two vehicles as the latter
drove along the road at 55 to 60 mph,
exceeding the speed limit of 35 mph. The
road eventually looped back to the highway
which Savage and Sharp turned and continued
to drive south. At this point, all four
vehicles were in the middle lane of three
right hand lanes of the highway. Agent Cook
asked Officer Thrasher to signal both vehicles
to stop. Thrasher pulled along side the Pontiac,
which was in the lead, turned on his flashing
light and motioned for the driver the of the
Pontiac to stop. As Sharp moved the Pontiac
into the right lane, the pick-up truck cut
between the Pontiac and Thrasher!s patrol car,
nearly hitting the patrol car and continued
down the highway. Thrasher pursued the truck
while Cook pulled up behind the Pontiac."
(Id at 610)
Viewing the above cited facts, we can see the reasoning of
the Supreme Court in summarily affirming the Court of Appeals
finding of reasonable suspicion.

Not only was there reasonable

suspicion in that case, but there was an actual violation of a
number of traffic offenses long before the officers turned on
their overhead lights in an attempt to stop the offending
vehicles.
Finally, the Supreme Court in the case of Sharp was
upholding the exercise of discretion by the trial court which
denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
The Utah Supreme Court has likewise expressed it's
reluctance in reversing a trial court's decision as to
admissibility of evidence.

Most recently, in the case of State

v. Gallegos, Supreme Court number 20349, 23 Utah Advance Report,

-8-

23, December 9, 1985, (filed November ?9, 1985), the Court stated
"At the outset it is important to note that this court will not
disturb the ruling of the trial court in questions of
admissibility of evidence unless it clearly appears that the
lower court was in error."

(Ld at 24)

The facts in the present case clearly support the ruling of
the District Court.

The crucial point of this entire scenario is

the moment that the officer detained the defendants by pulling
them over and ordering them out of the car.

There was no

indication that they had committed any crime.

At the moment the

officer turned on his overhead light to signal the defendants to
stop, his "reasonable suspicion" consisted of a car licensed in
the State of Arizona containing three Mexican occupants
proceeding at a relatively slow pace at 3:00 a.m.

These facts,

taken together, do not arise to the reasonable suspicion standard
required in Terry v. Ohio, and Florida v. Royer.

It is at this

point the officer's actions were clearly in violation of the
defendantf s rights.
CONCLUSION
Officer Malmborg had no right to detain these people even
momentarily, and he violated their constitutional rights by
subjecting then to a seizure of their persons and a search of
their vehicle.

Any evidence resulting from this stop should be

suppressed and excluded as "fruit of a poison tree."
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